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1.  Introduction
Recent developments within cognitive and computer supported conceptualiza-
tion have helped us to see why externalizing conceptual knowledge in visual 
forms has proved to be a much deeper problem than it was assumed to be in 
the pioneering era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Visualization has played a role 
in both recognizing the importance of sub-symbolic cognitive structures in ex-
plaining the difficulties of simulating our visual capacities, and in the emergence 
of graphical Knowledge Organization (KO) tools of Human and Computer In-
teractions (HCI). Among the KO tools that support memory recall, concept 
organization or design, and problem solving, we not only find tables, maps and 
diagrams but first of all graph based combinations of textual and non-textual 
symbolic structures. 
2.  Computational Simulation versus the Augmentation of 
Human Conceptualization
While debates in the pioneering period of AI centered on the question of whether 
physical symbol systems can think, in the seminal years of the 1960s in which 
computational semantics and machine representations of scientific conceptu-
alization appeared to converge into a happy symbiosis, alternative approaches 
already sought to address conceptual problem solving with a view not to simulate 
but to augment our knowledge organization activities. These approaches did not 
seek to demarcate the personal from objective knowledge, or human cognition 
from machine knowledge representation, they rather viewed cognitive structures, 
including “visual” ones, and their externalizations as co-evolving systems. Though 
the – by now obvious – idea of co-evolution became essential in various fields 
from processual archaeology to cognitive science, from the point of view of KO 
when situating the development of our symbolic and cognitive structures within 
the embodied and intent-dependent context of the human quest for meaning, 
it is important to contrast the computational alternatives of simulating concep-
tualization and augmentating the KO of the human intellect. If we review the 
prehistory of AI this distinction helps us to make clear that the way taken in the 
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1960s for using such a powerful tool as the computer for human problem solving 
was far from necessary.1
3.  Co-evolution & Time-binding: Contexts of the Nietzsche-
Korzybski-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis
The interdisciplinary issue of the coevolution of human cognition and external 
information structure records is more than a century old in linguistics, archae-
ology, anthropology, brain and cognitive sciences and the philosophy of mind. 
The interplay between words and written texts not only produced reflection on 
“impressions” and “ideas”, internal and external images, it moulded and gave 
substance to philosophical thinking from Plato to Wittgenstein. The detection 
of change in human thinking surfaced slowly. Nietzsche in particular helped 
to facilitate the linkage between languages and cultures, and “grammatically” 
determined “paths” of thought and ways of looking at the world”.2 In the 1960s, 
Havelock’s Preface to Plato3 highlighted changes in linguistic KO with his philo-
logical analysis of orality and textual literacy. Although The Gutenberg Galaxy4 
shifted attention to the supremacy of the visual, the context of the so-called 
“Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” remained essentially “linguistic”5 in the sense that 
the reference points of paradigmatic changes were textual externalization and 
its use. Media studies (including the pre-McLuhan ones) only gradually made 
computational interpretations, extending slowly to a full-blown consideration of 
the effect and potential of interacting with and by all forms of “computational” 
and human “presentational” devices. We cannot refer here to every historical 
turning point, except the crucial one, when it was both recognized and consid-
ered a call for alternative ways of conceptualization “that it [language] enslaves 
1 Thierry Bardini, Bootstrapping: Douglas Engelbart, Coevolution, and the Origins of 
Personal Computing, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000.
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), New York: Vintage Books, 1966, 
pp. 27–28.
3 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963.
4 Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1962.
5 “We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages … the world is pre-
sented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – 
and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds.” (Language, Thought and 
Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin L. Whorf, Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1956, p. 213. 
Italics added, acknowledging that Whorf distanced himself from exclusively linguistic 
conceptions of thinking.)
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us through the mechanism of the s[emantic] r[eaction] and the structure which 
a language exhibits, and impresses upon us unconsciously, is automatically pro-
jected upon the world around us”.6 Although – without computers – the con-
sequences of this thought were immediately drawn for human communication, 
suggesting new evaluative attitudes towards abstraction, I assert that separating 
the media of human cognition from computational facilities in terms of simulation 
(viewed as algorithmic programming) hindered the study of the non-linguistic 
structural aspects of concept development. It ignores the continuous correlation 
between the “external” and the “internal”, conscious and unconscious feedback 
mechanisms involving HCI, in spite of the impressive “mother of all demos” 
exhibiting the first systematic integration of the already available tools for such 
interactions in 1968.7
4.  General Semantics and the “Anthropometric” Structural 
Differential
A. Korzybski, founder of the General Semantics school, attempted to break the 
“bindings” of linguistic conceptualization as early as in 1921, and introduced in 
his Manhood and Humanity8 his notion of “time-binding”. It placed verbal and 
textual externalization of thought in the context of the general human ability to 
preserve experiences, together with the sharing and passing on of structurally 
organized information; with new forms of communication – the source(s) of an 
exponential growth of knowledge. He claimed that the unlimited development 
of higher and higher loops of abstractions opened the way for new kinds of sci-
entific representation, arguing later in Science and Sanity against “elementalism”, 
and the object-essentialist, “subject–predicate” nature of “Aristotelian verbal-
ism”. Instead of looking for epistemic casual connections between experience, 
propositions, and facts in terms of exclusively internal or external relations, as 
did Russell or the early Wittgenstein, he rejected the separation of (1) internal 
6 Alfred Korzybski, Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and 
General Semantics (1933), Lakeville, CT: Inst. of General Semantics, 1958, p. 90. Cf. 
Robert P. Pula, “The Nietzsche-Korzybski-Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis?”, ETC Review of 
General Semantics, vol. 49, no. 1 (1992), pp. 50–57.
7 See the demos of Engelbart’s oN-Line System (NLS: http://www.dougengelbart.org/
firsts/dougs-1968-demo.html) which not only included a structured, cross linked col-
laborative Open Hyperdocument System, but developed the computational kernel of 
its prospective permanent development.
8 Lakeville, CT: Inst. of General Semantics, 1950.
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activities of the mind, (2) their expression in externalized forms, and (3) the 
conception of objects in a mind-independent (or “neuro-logically” unaffected) 
external world. Despite the influence of Wittgensten’s Tractatus (including the 
desire to save our language use from certain types of verbalism), he gradually 
distanced himself from both an empiricist epistemology and linguistic theories 
of meaning which captured it within syntactic and external “semantic” systems. 
Starting from contemporary theories of “colloido-chemical” stimulus-response 
behaviour within organisms, problems arising within behaviour therapy, and 
the inseparability of the observer and the observed, he attempted to establish 
a new practical science of communicative human behaviour using “extensional” 
(physico-mathematical) methods. His new science of General Semantics drew 
up a model of human abstraction represented by his patented educational device, 
the Anthropometer (cf. Figure 1). It helped its users to focus on the “Structural 
Differential” inherent in our loops of abstractions, including perceptual object 
formation, and in distinguishing “silent” and “verbal” levels in different levels 
of our understanding processes (Figure 2). 
He saw “all knowledge as structure” and abstraction as leaving out and bring-
ing about differences. Impressed by Wittgenstein’s picture theory he identified a 
generalized similarity in all kinds of (physico-mathematical, verbal, etc.) struc-
tures operating at every (silent and verbal) level of abstraction, underlining that 
just as “the map is not the territory”, we are only able to grasp certain aspects 
with, and of our cognitive processes. This is because the “territory” does not 
lie outside these processes, and so the best we can do is try to keep track and 
make ourselves conscious about the generation of all those structures which our 
communicative processes permanently feed back into our abstractive processes. 
Anticipating in many aspects Polanyi’s conception of Personal Knowledge and 
current theories of embodied cognition, the Anthropometer was offered as an 
educational device for learning and practicing a new “evaluative orientation”, 
or epistemic “attitude” towards our “neuro–semantic” processes. As a learning 
tool it helps us to focus on abstraction moves, making its user recognize that it 
is not so much language that is the “limit of our world” but the totality of ac-
cumulated mathematical and “extensional” structures at our disposal – which 
can be considered as “languages” only in a parabolic sense. One may wonder 
what Korzybski would say if computers had been able to assist the “extensional” 
methods he proposed for developing better and better means for expressing, 
analyzing, and understanding what we mean.
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Figure 1:  Korzybski’s Anthropometer. The (infinite) parabola represents a domain of events 
(E) where “what we infer is going on” beyond our direct observation. The disc O 
(Object), different for humans (Oh1, Oh2, Oh3) and animals (O2, Oa), represents a 
“first (finite) abstraction”: the non-verbal perceptual result (sights, smells, sounds, 
etc.) of our human nervous systems reacting to the submicroscopic stuff on the 
non-verbal levels of experience. The disc represents what we experience versus 
what the events (E) actually are (and what we infer): a “joint phenomenon” 
of the observer and the observed. The first level labeled tag (L) represents the 
“descriptive” second order abstraction associating a symbol to the further 
abstracted, and symbolically related (A3 …) aspects of the “Object” naming/
symbolizing “just the facts” by semantic reactions. Higher level, evaluative 
abstractions (L1,…, Ln) which can be expressed by statements about lower level 
ones, are linked together in distinctively human chains (V1, V2, V3) of inferences, 
with the last one attached (feedback) to the domain of events about which we 
make our inferences. The holes represent the characteristics that exist at each 
level. The characteristics that are abstracted to the next level are indicated by the 
attached lines of abstractive links (A1, A2, A3) produced by our nervous system. 
The strings that don’t make it to the next level (B1, B2…) represent characteristics 
left out of (by) our abstractions, as do the holes without strings (A. Korzybski, 
Science and Sanity, pp. 387–398).
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Figure 2:  The main levels of abstracting from an “electro-colloidal” point of view in 
Korzybski’s non-Aristotelian system (A. Korzybski, “The Role of Language in the 
Perceptual Process”, in Robert R. Blake and Glann V. Ramsey, eds., Perception: 
An Approach to Personality, New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1951).
5.  Bootstrapping Augmentation Research
In the pioneering era of AI the “simulation approach” became dominant, exem-
plified by research programs promoted in the U.S. by J. C. R. Licklider which 
sought a “symbiosis” of man and machine. In these approaches the human 
and the “computational” domain were cognitively separated.9 Consequently, 
in “weak AI” the “simulation” and the “symbiosis” were expected to take place 
9 Although Licklider’s approach was different from Weiner’s or from M. Minski’s, his atti-
tude (like contemporary command line programmers’) is based on a division of labour: 
“Men will set the goals, formulate the hypotheses, determine the criteria and perform 
the evaluations. Computing machines will do the routinizable work that must be done 
to prepare the way for insights and decisions.” Cf. Giulio Jacucci et al., “Symbiotic 
Interaction: A Critical Definition and Comparison to other Human-Computer Para-
digms”, in Giulio Jacucci et al. (eds.), Symbiotic Interaction, Springer, 2014, pp. 3–20; 
and Bardini, op. cit., for the differences between Licklider’s and Engelbart’s human 
development oriented approach.
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only at a behavioural level, but even in strong AI without one domain partak-
ing in the processes of the other; a separation with far reaching consequences 
for the development of computer science and technology to the present day. 
There is now a general agreement that the huge investment in weak AI did not 
meet Licklider’s expectations, in spite its contribution to computing, and to 
modeling linguistic structures and verbal behaviour. Chinese-room resistant 
strong AI was essentially given up even in the case of neuron computers. Since 
the 1960s there were warnings about the developments which have led to the 
inability of the internet and the Semantic Web to deal with problems of infor-
mation overload and complexity, but did not mobilize behind an alternative 
problem solving paradigm. The attempts to translate first the Tractatus, than 
the later Wittgenstein into computational terms were apparently unaware of 
both Korzybski’s model of abstraction, and the adaptability of his thought to 
formal languages that “the structure which a language exhibits, and impresses 
upon us unconsciously” automatically influences our conceptualizations and 
language design. Economic interests had their role, but it is telling that despite 
the temporal “coincidence” of drawing the media theoretic consequences of 
these problems in the work of the members of the Toronto School and their 
disciples, another ground-breaking research program, led by D. C. Engelbart at 
SRI failed. He concentrated on the computational implementation of a system for 
collaborative KO in a Korzybskian self-reflective conception of “time-binding” 
which promoted the co-evolution of man and machine within the field of ef-
fective conceptualization and tool creating human problem solving.10 Engelbart 
generalized the “Sapir-Whorf hypothesis” (in the cultural, in the cognitive as 
well as in a technological sense) into a new approach based on what he called the 
“Neo-Whorfian hypothesis”11, which developed the central claim that cognitive 
conceptual structures co-evolve with the means of externalization. Augmentation 
research proceeds from the insight that the externalization of human symbol 
manipulation influences both our language and our way of thinking (including 
higher level visual and scientific abstractions) and that computers can “reveal 
the subtle relationships among its interacting elements”.12 Among the few whom 
10 D. Engelbart, “Computer Augmentation of Human Knowledge Work”, in B. Shaw 
(ed.), Computers and Communications: Proceedings of the Joint IBM/University of 
Newcastle Upon Tyne Seminar Held in the University Computing Laboratory 4th-7th 
September 1973, University of Newcastle upon Tyne Computing Laboratory, 
1973.
11 Cf. http://www.dougengelbart.org/pubs/augment-3906.html, 2c4f and ff.
12 Ibid., 2c4d (pp. 23 f.).
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he explicitly names in his 1962 Conceptual Framework, introducing the term 
“Augmentation” for the synergistic amplification of the Human Intellect, in 
which the “repertoire hierarchy” of Human and “Artifact Processes” co-evolve, 
Korzybski is referred at a key inspiration.13 Engelbart not only carries over 
Korzybski’s structural approach of concept formation to information system 
engineering and computational languages, but is also aware of the social, cogni-
tive, and evolutionary feedback mechanisms of concept and symbol manipula-
tion. “Under such evolutionary conditions”, he writes, “it would seem unlikely 
that the language we now use provides the best possible service to our minds 
in pursuing comprehension and solving problems. It seems very likely that a 
more useful language form can be devised.”14
6.  Engelbart’s Conception of Bootstrapping
With his team at SRI he not only managed to “show rather than tell” how the 
first NLS provides computer support for the collaborative solution of complex 
problems, but devised a “hard core” of computational solutions which produced 
the kernel of an augmented system that included many tools used in personal 
“computing” to this day. The extension of these early insights to computer 
supported knowledge work, including the externalization of conceptualiza-
tion processes in all fields of end-user governed design and problem solving, 
requires that we reconsider the “symbiotic interactions” in the foundations of 
literate, conceptual, reflective and intentional, meta-programming in an Engel-
bartian vein. He re-interpreted and “externalized” the Korzibskian processes of 
abstraction ploughing through the interface of the Innenwelt and the Umwelt in 
terms of HCI. In his view Bootstrapping the – computational – Augmentation 
of the human intellect assumes the development of cognitive and “extensional” 
symbolic methods of semiotic feedback looping which supervene – by the 
meaning spirals of HCI – on verbalism.15 The goal of building Augmentation 
Systems is to support the co-evolution of conceptual and computational knowl-
13 Ibid., 2c4c. In Toronto, Cambridge, Dartmouth, Pittsburg or Stanford no one seems to 
know Korzybski’s name in spite of some apparent latent mediations.
14 Ibid., 2c4e, italics added.
15 Bootstrapping the – computational – Augmentation of the human intellect assumes the 
Augmentation of the Bootstrapping cycles themselves, not just a community approach 
for “Boosting the Collective IQ” (as it is sometimes interpreted). Note that the lines of 
abstractions of the Antropometer are also fed back into the process, as the picture on 
the right side of Figure 1 above shows.
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edge architectures in generating emergent solutions to complex problems. In 
Bootstrapping (as a result of HCIs) meaning evolves. This is an implication 
not only of Science and Sanity but also of Peirce’s processual semiotics: “[f]or 
every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense that is no mere figure of 
speech … in its origin, either an image of the idea signified, or a reminiscence 
of some individual occurrence, person, or thing, connected with its meaning, 
or is a metaphor.”16 
7.  Processual Semiotics and Emergent Meaning
It is quite a distance from noting that “meaning inevitably grows, incorporates 
new elements and throws off old ones” to computer supported meaning con-
struction and emergent semantics.17 Peirce not only affected Korzybski, who read 
his Chance, Love and Logic,18 but his processual semiotics paved the way via new 
relational formalisms from association theories to symbolic graph-based inter-
pretation of KO. Contemporary Peirce scholarship tends to consider his work 
on Existential Graphs as an attempt to formulate a common “language” for the 
representation of reasoning which was capable to incorporate symbolic logic.19 
The Engelbartian conclusion that just as the “state of a language at a given time 
strongly affects its own evolution”, can be extended in terms of Peirce’s concep-
16 The Essential Peirce 2:264 (The Ethics of Terminology, 1903), see also MS 618 and 634 
(1909).
17 Ibid., 2:222. Especially, because a computational process is quite different from a physi-
cal process, and its scientific description in terms of “extensional” methods as Korzyb-
ski suggests.
18 Charles S. Peirce, Chance, Love and Logic: Philosophical Essays, ed. by M. R. Cohen, 
New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1923.
19 See e. g. John F. Sowa, “Conceptual Graphs for Representing Conceptual Structures”, 
in Pascal Hitzler and Henrik Scharfe (eds.), Conceptual Structures in Practice, Chap-
man and Hall/CRC, 2009, pp. 101–136; also Sowa, “The Role of Logic and Ontology 
in Language and Reasoning”, in Roberto Poli and Johanna Seibt (eds.), Theory and 
Applications of Ontology: Philosophical Perspectives, Dordrecht: Springer, 2010, pp. 231–
263; or Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, “Getting Closer to Iconic Logic”, in Susan Stuart and 
Gordana Dodig Crnkovi (eds.), Computation, Information, Cognition: The Nexus and 
the Liminal, Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2007; and Frederik Stjernfelt, 
“Iconicity of Logic – and the Roots of the ‘Iconicity’ Concept”, in Hiraga et al. (eds.), 
Iconicity: East Meets West, Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2015, pp. 35–53. Pietarinen 
even rejects “the distinction between logical and extra-logical notion of diagrammatic 
representations”.
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tion of semiosis and dynamics of knowledge production to visual “languages” 
because their meta-level organization can be treated as an evolving articulation 
process.20 Such dynamic systems are capable of developing into a succeeding state 
if the applied technology provides us with the means/tools for meta-reflection 
that are able to enhance the utilization of our tacit knowledge in externalized 
forms. The evolving and self-organizing nature of articulation, however, can be 
detected in both cognitive and artificial systems. This is because the augmenta-
tion of conceptualization, just as the external manipulation of “things”, and their 
conceptual architectures in a human created environment is essential both for em-
bodied cognition and for computer supported KO. Reflecting on current positions 
on computational (Engelbart) and cognitive aspects of bootstrapping (Quine, 
Carey),21 we can “show rather than tell” their co-active interdependency. Just like 
the NLS demo did, it is possible to demonstrate this interdependency within crea-
tive problem solving by an exploratory implementation of MindGraph.22 It is the 
alpha version of the first App of the kernel of a knowledge augmentation engine, 
WikiNizer™Research, which is not only a tool for linked data visualization but 
also a WYSIWYM interface for the semantic enrichment of meaning, adopting 
new forms of graph-based Emergent Semantics.23
20 Engelbart, see http://www.dougengelbart.org/pubs/augment-3906.html, 2c4d. 
Cf. Torill Strand, “Peirce’s Rhetorical Turn: Conceptualizing Education as Semio-
sis”, Educational Philosophy and Theory, vol. 45, no. 7 (2013), pp. 789–803; and 
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, “Existential Graphs: What a Diagrammatic Logic of Cog-
nition Might Look Like”, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 32, no. 3 (2011), 
pp. 265–281.
21 Susan Carey, The Origin of Concepts, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009; see 
also Vyvyan Evans, How Words Mean: Lexical Concepts, Cognitive Models and Meaning 
Construction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.
22 See http://linkedup-project.eu/2014/12/22/wikinizer-introducing-mindgraph.
23 “What-You-See-Is-What-You-Mean”, cf. Ali Khalili and Sören Auer, “WYSIWYM – 
Integrated Visualization, Exploration and Authoring of Semantically Enriched Un-
structured Content”, Semantic Web (2013); see also Karl Aberer et al., “Emergent Se-
mantics Principles and Issues”, in Y. Lee et al. (eds.), Database Systems for Advanced 
Applications, Berlin: Springer, 2004.
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Figure 3:  A Snapshot of WikiNizeR™ MindGraph
8.  Concept Maps and the Dynamics of MindGraph
MindGraph delivers a semantic visualization framework for human conceptual-
ization as a personal knowledge organization tool which augments conceptual 
problem solving by interfacing personal knowledge and web research. It uses 
Concept Map-type visual, and page based Wiki-like knowledge management in 
the conviction that a visualized meta-reflective analysis of Knowledge Architec-
tures (in the form of concept nets, and higher conceptual architectures) helps us 
discover effective concepts. D. Ausubel’s and Novak’s approach to concept learn-
ing has generated static CMaps to represent individual cognitive structures and 
became, as J. Sowa points out, visual KO applications of the originally logically 
minded relational graphs of Peirce.24 The “WikiNizer Way” of conceptualization 
confirmed that CMaps as semantic tools of conceptualization enhance our visual 
knowledge organization and symbol-structuring, whereas Wikinizer not only 
supplies static computational representations of inter-personal knowledge (e. g., 
24 Cf. http://cmap.ihmc.us/docs/theory-of-concept-maps; see also the references to Sowa 
in note 19 above.
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semantic representations of the structure of propositions, or lexical ontologies) 
but can support the situated dynamics of concept formation. Unlike “God’s eye” 
conceptions of ontology building, the externalization of semantic information 
is intent dependent. Defining new relations and discovering semantically rich 
structures is a precondition of emergent semantics and meaning construction.25 
MindGraph creates dynamic graph based visual structures which articulate the 
relationships that exist within knowledge items blending iconic, pictorial, lexi-
cal, and potentially any digital form. Creating a visual Memex it facilitates the 
emergence of new concepts in an associative trail-bush of contents organized 
in page based graph structures. The homoiconicity of these graph structures of-
fers a uniform treatment of intent dependent sorts, attributes, aspects, and typed 
relations within some given material as a self-organizing system, supplying us 
with a technological key to conceptual reorganization at the meta levels of the 
knowledge graph. At the same time it makes possible simultaneous mapping of 
the corresponding changes into the organization of the domain knowledge. The 
implementation of a dynamic visual conceptualization environment speaks for 
itself given the current problems of the Semantic Web. It answers the need to re-
alize a bootstrappable dynamic visual concept organization framework for intent 
dependent problem solving fifty years after the implementation of NLS.
25 András [G.] Benedek and G. Lajos, “Conceptualization and Visual Knowledge Or-
ganization: A Survey of Ontology Based Solutions”, INTED2014 Proceedings (2014), 
pp. 4609–4619.
